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ResumenEste trabajo discute la política territorial a partir de Colombia como caso de estudio. La geografía fracturada de Colombia, su diversidad regional y las 
características de su sociedad dividida explican las principales tensiones políticas, el 
conflicto armado, la debilidad del Estado, la criminalidad y la desigualdad ecoómica. 
La baja presencia del Estado o su marginalidad en la cultura dominante ha sido 
señalada en conceptos como “territories diferenciados”, “zonas de ausencia estatal”, 
“fronteras económicas” o “zonas de resistencia”. En este context resalta mucho el tema 
de la territorialidad y la política territorial. Divido la historia del país en 4 etapas: 1) la 
conquista y la diferenciación del espacio cultural, (2) la construcción de la nación en 
un contexto de barbarie, (3) la autodefensa, Resistencia territorial y seguridad nacional 
(1930-1980), y (4) fracaso del territorio estatal y la gobernabilidad neoliberal (1990 hasta 
el presente). A partir del caso colombiano, defino el territorio a partir de las estrategias y 
tecnologías que se expanden con transformaciones tangibles del espacio natural y social 
con efectos claros en la cultura, los derechos y las prácticas económicas. Hay que aceptar 
que los límites territoriales nunca son claros porque las culturas mueven y cambian el 
espacio social, las estrategias de producción y las prácticas del uso de la tierra.
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Abstract
The paper contributes to discussions on territorial politics by using Colombia as a 
case study. Colombia’s fractured geography, regional diversity, and divided society 
feature prominently as explanations of the country’s main political tensions such as 
armed conflict, state weakness, criminality, and economic inequality. Areas of low 
state presence or at the margins of the dominant culture have been variously labeled as 
“territories of difference,” “zones of state absence,” “economic frontiers,” or “zones of 
resistance.”  In such analyses references to territoriality and territorial politics feature 
prominently. I divide the country’s history into four different times (1) Conquest and 
the differentiation of cultural space, (2) Nation-building and the barbarian hinterland, 
(3) Self-defense, territorialized resistance and national security (1930-1980); and (4) 
Failure of the Territorial State and Neoliberal Governance (1990-present). Based on a 
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and technologies that produce widespread and tangible 
transformations of natural and social space with clear 
effects on culture, rights and economic practices. It 
must also accept that territorial boundaries are never 
clear because cultures move and change their social 
space, production strategies and land-use practices.
Key Words: Colombia, Territory, Territoriality.
Territory and Territoriality in Colombian Politics
Introduction
Most prevalent theories on democracy and state 
formation assume that a territory is no more than a spatial 
marker signaling a state’s turf. For example, conventional 
views of the state assert that the government’s political 
authority derives from its monopoly over the use 
of force and its jurisdictional claims over people, 
property, and transactions. This takes for granted the 
idea that a territorially contained people, normally a 
cultural majority, define the nation-state’s spatial and 
jurisdictional limits. However, the territorial and social 
boundaries of the state are far from clear (Mitchel 1991; 
Migdal 2001). This presents problems for studies of 
democracy (Ochoa 2011), nationalism (Moore 1998), and 
just access and ownership of natural resources (Nine 
2008a; 2008b). Territory then must be more carefully 
theorized (Elden 2010). As a type of space that encloses 
and reflects governance strategies and technologies 
(Elden 2010), it shapes both human and natural 
environments. Territorial strategies and technologies are 
informed by culture, particular forms of knowledge, and 
historical junctures that express hegemonic ideas and 
the interests of both established and contentious groups. 
Colombia’s fractured geography, regional diversity, 
and divided society feature as explanations of armed 
conflict, state weakness, criminality, and economic 
inequality. Unlawfulness and economic development 
were as much the concern of nineteenth century positivist 
thinkers imagining a country divided between civilized 
and barbarian lands, as they are in current analyses of 
territorial disintegration or poor governance. Areas of low 
state presence, or at the margins of the dominant culture 
or economy have been labeled as “territories of difference” 
(Escobar 2008), “zones of state absence” (González, 
Bolívar and Vásquez 2002), “economic or land frontiers” 
(Le Grand 1986; Rausch 2013) or “zones of resistance” 
(González 1992; Medina 1989). Reference to territory thus 
features prominently in the study of Colombia. I argue 
that a comparison of Colombia’s territory in historical 
perspective not only helps clarify aspects of Colombian 
political history, it also contributes to theoretical 
understandings of territorial politics. 
Territory and Territorial Politics
State Space or Territory as a Component
of Political Systems
The territorial state is a relatively new phenomenon 
that did not cover all of the world’s land. The territorial 
state emerged after Westphalian treaties compelled 
governments to recognize each other’s authority and 
territorial limits (Sassen 2006). The nation-state bundled 
rights and authority in coterminous spaces that gave 
a national sovereign exclusive authority over a given 
territory while ensuring a similar dynamic in other 
nation-states (Sassen 2006: 6). The European territorial 
states then became a political unit to expand the national 
goals of a bourgeoisie over other territories.
Before the hegemony of the territorial state, the basic 
political choice was how to position oneself vis-à-vis 
the state (Scott 2009). Scott (2009: 324) describes the 
following four eras of state development (1) stateless era; 
(2) small-scale states encircled by vast and easily reached 
stateless peripheries (3) period in which such peripheries 
are shrunken and beleaguered by the expansion of state 
power, and finally (4) an era in which virtually the entire 
globe is administered space and the periphery is not much 
more than a folkloric remnant. 
Scott (2009) argues that what is being evaded is the 
situation of subjects of the state, but not a relationship 
with the state. Latin American pre-conquest societies for 
example, remained in remote, inaccessible regions far from 
the centers of Spanish control. These were geographically 
forbidding regions of little or no economic value to the 
Spanish (Scott 2009). Such landscapes supported regions 
of refuge “located in areas that are particularly hostile 
or inaccessible to human movement, where exploitation 
of available resources necessitates the investment of 
considerable effort even for modern technology, and where 
this effort is not recompensed proportionately” (Aguirre 
1979: 23). Aguirre (1979) explains that zones of refuge 
emerge out of the competition by different cultures for 
territory and resources to settle in places that can supply 
the means for them to live and perpetuate themselves in 
accordance with their technology. 
The most recent era of state expansion started roughly after 
1945 and the nation-state “is now busy projecting its power 
to its outermost territorial borders and mopping up zones 
of weak or no sovereignty” (Scott 2009: xii). The need for 
the natural resources of the “tribal zone” and the desire to 
ensure the security and productivity of the periphery has 
led, everywhere, to strategies of “engulfment.” What Scott 
calls nonstate spaces, or locations where, “owing largely to 
geographical obstacles, the state has particular difficulty 
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in establishing and maintaining its authority. Such non-
state zones could be used as “sanctuaries” for anti-state 
forces. These are not exactly “lawless sanctuaries” but 
more precisely, refuges from state power. In contrast, 
State spaces are zones of rent, taxation, conscription, 
tribute, tradable goods, etc. The encounter between 
expansionary states and self-governing peoples has 
been variously defined as encounters between the raw 
and the cooked, the wild and the tamed, the hill/forest 
people and the valley/cleared-land people, the barbarian 
and the civilized (Scott 2009). The state’s project was to 
civilize such barbarians, justifying racist, colonialist 
oppressive measure (Scott 2009: 3). 
State expansion, almost complete since it became 
accelerated in the 1950s can be seen as the last enclosure 
movement “to integrate and monetize the people, lands, 
and resources of the periphery so that they become 
[…] contributors to the gross national product” (Scott 
2009: 4). Unintegrated territories contain essential 
natural resources for the development of electronics, 
hydroelectricity, bioprospecting or conservation, thus 
becoming valuable to capitalist development and are thus 
the object of a new rush (Scott 2009: 11). There a clear link 
between environmental crisis and state expansion, and 
thus, increasing concern with debating what justifies the 
state, its territorial presence, and its land allocation rights.
Territorial Rights: The Liberal View
Liberal debates largely center on the state’s moral rights 
to establish order, administer justice, and legitimately 
represent the people who occupy that territory, in other 
words, rights of jurisdiction, to access resources, and to 
control borders (Miller 2011). However, there is some 
debate on the interpretation of Lockean theory on 
property. The standard reading of Locke establishes that 
the state’s territorial rights stem from the property rights 
of individuals who band together to form a political society 
that then has the right to exercize territorial jurisdiction 
over their private properties (Nine 2008a, 2008b; Van der 
Vossen 2014). Alternatively, a collectivist interpretation of 
Lockean points out that a state (which represents a group 
of property owners who have ceded some of its rights over 
property) gains territorial rights through its collective 
labor on the land (Nine 2008a, 2008b). This right gives the 
state powers to establish justice within a particular region. 
This is quite different to property rights since these only 
give the bearer the right to exclude others from benefiting 
from a thing (Nine 2008a: 149, 2008b: 961). 
States can establish property rights because (1) as any 
other agent, it is capable of changing the land, thereby 
creating a relationship with it; and (2) its relationship with 
land is morally valuable following principles of liberty, 
desert and efficiency (Nine 2008a: 155). But rather than 
establishing rights to property, these conditions establish 
the state’s rights to territory (Nine 2008a: 155). The state’s 
land-changing labor is evident through the creation, 
adjudication, and enforcement of laws that sustain systems 
of production, ways to use resources, and enforcement of 
property rights (Nine 2008a: 155). 
Van der Vossen (2014) concludes that Locke established 
a clear conceptual distinction between property and 
sovereignty suggesting that these are disanalogous 
because the rules for the succession of political authority 
are not like those for the transfer of property, and owning 
property is not the same as being sovereign. The territorial 
rights of the state protect liberty and are “a prerequisite for 
the realization of the right to self-determination” (Nine 
2008a: 157-158).” States also earn or deserve territorial 
rights because they help organize polity members 
and coordinate technological advances, research, or 
conservation that increases the value of territory, thus 
the value of people’s properties. The desert principle also 
recognizes a particular state’s historical rights to a territory 
(Nine 2008a: 160). The efficiency principle, Locke’s primary 
explanation for the coming into existence of a political 
society, is both necessary but problematic. The state’s 
territorial jurisprudence helps individual owners make a 
more efficient use of land by providing a common judge to 
enforce law and thus stabilize and give value to a system of 
property rights (Nine 2008a). Locke’s limiting principle of 
efficiency however, brings up problems, if: 
(1) “the current right holder to land is wasting the land; 
and (2) others are being severely harmed because of the 
burden that the right places on them not to access or 
use the land, then the current right holders may have 
their rights limited so as to allow others access to the 
land. There is a lot of controversy packed into this 
limiting principle of efficiency, including the ambiguous 
and perhaps culturally relative nature of ‘wasted’ and 
‘harmed’ (Nine 2008a: 162).”
“Efficient” versus “wasted” uses of land will mean 
different things for different peoples, even if it can be safely 
assumed that all cultures value certain goods provided 
by the exploitation of land, such as food, water, natural 
resources, shelter, as well as places to gather and a basic 
infrastructure (Meisels 2002, Nine 2008a)1. This explains 
why some of the most intractable disputes over territory 
arise when modern nations and aboriginal groups make 
rival claims to the same piece of territory (Miller 2011)
___________________________________________________________
1	 Meisels,	T.	(2002)	‘Efficiency-Based	Territorial	Claims’,	Political Stu-
dies, 50 (5), 959–73.
4  Año 8, número especial, mayo, 2016 
Territory and Territoriality in Colombian Politics
Contextualizaciones                              
The Primitive Rights of States
Another strand on Liberal theory rejects Locke altogether 
as a good starting point to understand the state’s territorial 
rights, and resorts to Kant who argues that the state has 
primitive rights, which then helps solve some of the 
problems that a Lockean reading leaves unresolved (Stilz 
2009). Lockean approaches to territorial rights fail to 
explain “how the state can establish a continuous territory; 
why later generations consent to the state’s jurisdiction; 
and why non-consenting property owners cannot secede” 
(Stilz 2009: 1895). Kant shows more accurately why 
jurisdictional powers must be attributed only to states – 
and not to individuals or groups – because only states can 
articulate an objective interpretation of property rights that 
imposes binding duties on individuals. A state has a claim 
to a particular territory because it defines and enforces 
property rights on that territory (Stilz 2009: 205). Kant 
contends that only states can promulgate unitary, public, 
and objective binding rights in a given area to set limits 
to property (Stilz 2009). This reading of Kant establishes 
that the state’s jurisdictional rights are primitive, or not 
subject to people’s prior ownership of property (Stilz 2009: 
185). Since the state defines and enforces property rights 
consistent with everyone’s freedom, living under the 
state is not a choice, but a moral imperative. This reading 
of Kant recognizes the state as a separate entity which 
individuals have as their moral obligation to obey. 
A Kantian view holds that “(a) the state effectively 
implements a system of law regulating property in that 
territory; (b) the system of law meets minimal criteria 
for securing the people’s consent, by guaranteeing their 
most basic rights; and (c) the state is not a usurper. Kant 
argues that there are no ‘natural’ titles to ownership; 
these only exist when there is a public authority to 
delineate and enforce them (Stilz 2009). Kant suggests 
that human beings therefore have a duty to accept the 
authority of states, in order that the bounds to their 
respective properties can be determined, and even goes 
so far as to claim that we may be forced into the state 
against our will (6:312). State rights to territory are not 
derived through prior delegation of jurisdictional rights 
by individuals: they are primitive (Stilz 2009: 198).”
Contrary to Lockean theories, Kant uses the social contract 
as a heuristic device for testing the legitimacy of the state’s 
laws (Stilz 2009). The ‘original contract’ principle serves as 
a norm by which to judge actually existing constitutions, 
and governments are obliged to reform in order to suit 
this ideal; constitutions conforming to the ideal of an 
original contract will secure individual freedom, equality, 
and independence as a citizen (Stilz 2009). In conclusion, 
states that protect a minimal threshold of freedom for 
each citizen can possess territorial rights (Stilz 2009). The 
author believes that such minimal standards include most 
of the rights contained in the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights which are generally compatible with a liberal 
democracy (Stilz 2009). If a state guarantees such rights, 
it exercises a rightful or legitimate relationship with its 
subjects and can set moral demands on its subjects.
The liberal perspective on territory offer insight into 
matters of state legitimacy, but fail to address the historical 
development of the state and the role of domestic social 
conflict and international pressures in the creation of 
space state. Here, the Marxist conceptualization of social 
space as something that exists in relationship with other 
spaces, offers a better alternative to understand the 
historical process of state development.
Territory as social space: The Marxist View
Marxist theory of space builds on the work of Lefevbre, 
one of the first to recognize the importance of social space 
in the economic domination and containment of class 
conflict. Space is a social construct and every society and 
form of production produces its own space and spatial 
practices (Lefebvre 1991: 31). The appropriation of space 
implicates a spatial practice, a rhythm, and economic 
relationships with other spaces (Lefebvre 1991). Lefevbre 
(1991: 33) describes social space in terms of (1) Spatial 
practice: the particular locations where the processes of 
production and reproduction occur; (2) representations 
of space or the order imposed by relations of production 
and which occur in the form of knowledge, signs, 
codes; and (3) representational space or the complex 
symbolisms (sometimes coded, sometimes not) linked to 
the clandestine side of social life. 
Relations of production (i.e. the division of labor) and 
social relations of reproduction (i.e. relations between the 
sexes and age groups, as well as the organization of the 
family) occur in specified and often, hierarchically placed 
spaces.  In contrast to previous social orders, not only has 
the development of capitalism intensified the hierarchical 
division of space, it has also clearly divided reproductive 
from productive spaces (e.g. in pre-capitalist societies 
these two spheres were closer together). The division of 
labor is strictly spatialized (Santos 1979). In addition, there 
is less and less natural space left. 
Space therefore “is not a thing or event, but rather a 
framework for things and events” (Harvey 1969, cites 
Popper 1963: 179), and because it is produced, space 
is a historical concept (Lefevbre 1991). Space exists in 
relationships with other spaces and reflects different 
technologies of production. For example, Santos (1979) 
identified two clearly connected and dependent urban 
circuits produced by different technologies of production 
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(i.e. social relations of production): an upper (modern, 
capitalist, urban, export, modern trading) and a lower 
(non-capitalist manufacturing, non-modern trading) 
circuit. Each circuit operates in specific spaces and an 
“individual’s capacities to both produce and consume 
largely depend on his location” (Santos 1979: 8). 
“Though the constitution and reconstitution of space 
in underdeveloped countries is conditioned by external 
interests often operating on a world-wide scale, their 
impact on spatial factors is localized  and subject to 
considerable inertia” (Santos 1979: 7).
In sum, territorial processes support the tendency of 
capitalism to disguise class conflict (Sack 1986: 47), by 
creating a sense of emptiable space (Sack 1986) that puts 
territory at the service of capitalist economic relations 
to further impersonal relationships. Emptiable space 
also refers to mobility, especially of labor which once 
was bound to land (Sack 1986). Increased trade and 
mobility, both positive events, however helped capitalist 
elites to mold and control human spatial organization 
in a wider scale (Sack 1986: 87), thus supporting 
hierarchies and helping contain class conflict.
Social movements and what sets territorial
and land conflicts apart
In the current juncture territories are managed using 
capitalist strategies and are therefore highly unequal and 
stratified. Because such strategies and technologies of 
governance become embedded in the “webs of life” (c.f. 
Harvey 1973) territorial conflicts can be intractable. Some 
of the most effective social movements—not necessarily 
because they manage to replace state power but essentially 
because they contest the spatial legitimacy of said 
government—are territorialized social movements. 
Territorial disputes are distinctive because “at their core 
[they are] disputes between conflicting ontologies of land” 
or ethnogeographies (Kolers 2009: 14). Territorial rights 
claims are not all secessionist or nationalist movements, but 
rather demands to make ethnogeographic claims possible 
through institutional and socioeconomic practices (Kolers 
2009). Ethnic social movements have largely been at the 
forefront of such claims. As exemplified by Latin America’s 
ethnic movements, such ethnogeographic reframed 
Liberal Constitutional foundations and led to post-
Liberal political claims (Yashar 2006). Ethno-territorial 
resistance in the region escalated when policies reduced 
autonomy by facilitating government or third-party access 
to land and resources. Communities overcame collective 
action problems by making territoriality claims involving 
spatially-based access to resources and mobilization 
networks (Beaumont & Nicholls, 2007). In the case of 
ethnic groups, territoriality claims increasingly counter 
the incorporation of ancestral land into state-centered 
territorial regimes by negotiating autonomy and collective 
property rights (Chirif & García, 2007) not just for political 
and economic reasons, but also for symbolic meanings 
and functions in the reproduction of local social relations.
In particular, social movements from humid tropical 
forests emphasized four main rights: territory, identity, 
political autonomy and their own vision of development 
and economy. Their right to exist was framed as a political, 
ecological and cultural claim (Escobar 1999). The regional 
territory in the case of Latin America was an ethnic 
category, and became a useful strategy for the social 
movement to relate with base communities and a political 
construct to defend traditional livelihoods (Escobar 1999). 
Ethnic social movement thus promoted a particular vision 
of conservation and biodiversity, and as they articulated 
biodiversity with cultural and territorial defense, these 
social movements configured an alternative political 
ecology framework to the technocratic prescriptions 
on the environment (Escobar 1999). The movements 
influenced multilateral organizations like the World 
Bank and the United Nations Convention for Biological 
Diversity, as well as large NGOs and communities of 
scientists and helped create a network that produced a 
discourse on biodiversity (Escobar 1999). 
Multicultural reforms in Latin America addressed ethno-
territorial claims by devolving power to ethnic groups as 
a way to reverse internal colonialism. The reforms let local 
authorities regulate cultural patterns, social institutions 
and legal systems within delimited ancestral territories 
(Cal y Mayor 2013; Martínez 2013), and required legal 
pluralism at the constitutional level (Van Cott, 2000). 
Multicultural reforms overlapped with legislation on 
environmental governance. Based on the assumption that 
indigenous communities share sustainable environmental 
governance practices (Dove, 2006), indigenous self-
determination and the demarcation of collective lands was 
encouraged as an appropriate way to address sustainable 
development and social justice. Natural resource scholars 
concur that decentralization may lead to effective 
environmental governance, and are most concerned 
with problems of collective action and rule development 
to manage dynamic natural systems embedded in 
complicated and overlapping political environments 
(Ostrom 1990). 
Considerations for a definition of territory
Space is full of meaning that provides personal and 
collective attachment, which helps explain phenomena 
such as nationalism and the impulse to conserve 
meaningful spatial markers (Tuan 1977). It contains 
significant relations of production and reproduction, as 
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well as epochal markers and economic footprints. Territory 
is a culture’s habitat (Chirif and García), however, not all 
groups or individuals will undeniably accept a cultural or 
political majority’s particular version of history or values 
to legitimize the state’s territory and authority (Moore 
1998). In theory then, territory should not be defined as 
a function of the values shared by a plurality of people 
contained within spatial borders. 
Recourse to democracy is suggested as a solution to this 
dilemma (Moore 1998: 154). Nevertheless, democratic theory 
has little to say about territory itself since it also takes it for 
granted as the definitive criterion for demarcating people. 
This presents a theoretical paradox which, according to 
Ochoa (2013: 475), could be resolved by resorting to criterion 
on: (1) “decision independence” or that territories be defined 
independently from people; (2) “rootedness” or that territory 
be compatible with democratic governance and legitimacy; 
(3) “equality” or that territorial belonging be equally arbitrary 
to all human beings; and (4) “feasibility” or that territory 
be compatible with sociological and historical reality. A 
democratic theory of territory thus warrants attention to the 
“environmental and political relations existing in specific 
geographical areas… [which would] help steer democratic 
theory away from intractable debates about identity 
and towards new questions about democratic practices, 
environmental relations, and stewardship” (Ochoa 2013: 475).
These criteria demand a clear definition of territory. 
So far we have rejected the idea that territories should 
be understood as bound geographic space claimed or 
occupied by a group or institution, normally a state. This 
ignores the complex ways in which territories are produced 
and how they reflect strategies to assert power (Sack 1986; 
Storey 2001). Territories service a number of primal 
human needs by supporting our habitats and helping us 
shape our culture, institutions, and identities. They offer 
a space to live (i.e. land, water, ice), natural resources, and 
a set of social, economic, ecosystemic, and environmental 
cycles on which humans depend (Kolers 2009). Elden 
(2010) argues that a definition of territory should be based 
on the fact that they reflect techniques for measuring land 
and strategies for controlling terrain, as well as economic 
tactics (Elden 2010: 799). Elden’s definition of territory 
as strategy and technology should be complemented by 
Kolers (2009) concept of ethnogeography to capture the 
role of culture in the definition and delimitation of space. 
It should also capture the role of social movements in 
revealing the boundaries of specific territories. 
Territoriality in Colombia
According to the literature, two distinct territorial 
logics are at play in Colombia: (1) an inter-ethnic logic 
that highlights how Indian/black flight from the main 
hacienda economy created sociocultural spaces that 
became a defining characteristic of the Colombian state 
and the country’s cultural identity. In other words, the 
country’s political culture was largely defined in terms 
of the positioning of specific groups with respect to 
frontiers of civilization and barbarism; and (2) a logic of 
agrarian violence, where efforts to incorporate peripheral 
territories to grow the national economy have triggered 
intractable conflict (García 2003). In this section I divide 
Colombia’s history into four times that encapsulate 
different historical junctures with respect to territorial 
dynamics. These dynamics explain a legacy of raced-based 
territorial segregation during the conquest; positivist ideas 
on the frontier at the time of independence; territorial 
resistance based on agrarian and communist ideologies in 
the first half of the twentieth century; and failed neoliberal 
governance and spiraling violence since the 1990s.
Time 1: Conquest and the differentiation
of cultural space
Colombia’s fractured geography challenged Spanish 
efforts to settle and control all land and people, and 
allowed groups of natives, and eventually, a diaspora 
of subaltern castes or classes to escape the encomienda 
system. Spanish authorities separated zones of civilization 
from surrounding badlands, eventually identifying 
urban centers with the Spanish and the hinterland with 
Indians, or mixed-race people escaping Spanish purview. 
The Spanish “barbarian periphery” was the product of 
resistance to conquest and was 
“composed of defectors from more complex, settled 
societies deliberately placing themselves at a distance 
from the dangers and oppressions of state space. To 
do this often meant forsaking their permanent fields, 
simplifying their social structure, and splitting into 
smaller, more mobile bands (Scott 2009: 132).” 
The Spanish faced resistance well into the seventeenth 
century in most of the Andes and Caribbean of 
modern Colombian. Some of the most contentious 
groups, such as the Nasa (Páez) in the modern day 
Cauca department, finally subjected themselves to 
Spanish rule after accords granted Indians in their 
land some protections, and the Spanish accepted 
that some “vacant” and unproductive lands would be 
outside their complete control.  Conquest chronicles 
of indomitable people and rugged nature explained 
how the Spanish found frontiers of rebellion in the 
southern regions of Mocoa and Sucumbios, the Guajira 
peninsula and Sierra Nevada, and the hinterlands of 
the Magdalena River (Serje 2005). But as the case of 
the Wayuu, whose territory spans Colombia’s northern 
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Caribbean, many Spaniards were interested in the tax 
evasion and contraband opportunities offered by these 
territories (Serje 2005).
Fray Bartolome de las Casas’s documentation of Spanish 
atrocities prompted the protection of native labor. 
Between 1528 and 1536, and after violent pacification and 
plundering of native lands and populations, the Crown 
began regulating the movement and residence of the 
Spanish, while indigenous populations were placed in so-
called “Indian towns” (Zuluaga 2001: 154). Encomenderos 
lived in the city and received tribute in kind or in services 
collected by the heads of Indian cabildos. Once confined 
to Indian towns or reserves resistance strategies included 
feigning illness, claiming inability to organize enough 
people to work in Spanish properties, insubordination, 
and escape (Zuluaga, 2001). The Spanish settled urban 
centers and dominated proximate rural settings organized 
around a hacienda economy (Aprile Gniset 1992), but were 
surrounded by a hinterland that offered a population in 
resistance opportunities to escape colonial order (Valencia 
1996). Indigenous peoples were forced into the status of 
subjects of the Spanish Crown and later, of wards of the 
Colombian government (Cortés, 1984, Zuluaga, 2001, 
Diaz, 2001, Gros, 1991, Findji and Rojas, 1985).  
Time 2: Nation-building and the barbarian hinterland
The conquest thus left a legacy of differentiated cultural 
space which naturalized the association of specific 
landscapes with categories of people (Serje 2005). Spatial 
segregation produced a political order where Spaniards, 
creoles, and light skin mestizos lived in “civilized” urban, 
temperate highlands or valleys, while Indians, runaway 
slaves, or rebellious peasants settled for territories in 
“uncivilized,” hot, heavily forested lowlands, effectively 
producing race categories connected to specific territories 
(Aprile Gniset 1992, Serje 2005). Governing elites readily 
defined themselves in relation to cultural or economic 
“others” confined to lands outside their reach. Post-colonial 
settlement and state development patterns continued to 
produce spatial boundaries that separated the civilized 
from the savage, the urban from the rural, or the legal 
from the illegal, creating a dichotomy between a “national 
integrated space” in the highlands and “discontinuous, 
diffused, spaces” in the lowlands (Zambrano 1992). 
Private property was constrained to a specific social class 
that controlled land and labor, while the periphery offered 
subaltern groups the possibility to escape oppressive 
conditions and erect their own societies and systems of 
production. Peripheral lands in the Cauca river valley 
for example, notoriously offered a diverse population of 
mestizos, poor whites, or mulattos the opportunity to 
settle forested areas thus producing new forms of land 
ownership and transforming the environment, and 
subsequently constituting the social base for what would 
later become a class of peasants (Motta and Perafán 2010). 
Escaped slaves also settled harder to reach areas and 
participated in the production of subsistence crops. 
During this period, influential elites held “Turnerian 
views” of the frontier as a dividing line between 
civilization and savagery (c.f. Turner 1921). Works of 
literature, government, and travel logs reflect both 
fascination and fear of the exuberant beauty, bounty and 
impenetrable nature of much of the country’s land, as well 
as the vacuums of power it offered for uncivilized cultures, 
illegality and violence (Serge 2005). Writers such as José 
María Samper claimed in 1860 that literate, civilized men 
living in the temperate zones of the Andes had to elevate 
themselves above a burning, overwhelming nature, 
in order to control, manage, and categorize this same 
nature (Serje 2005: 102). Such positivist, Social Darwinist 
thinkers not only scorned other cultures, they disparaged 
Colombia’s natural environment (Jaramillo 2011).
By the 1850s these elites devoted efforts to obtaining 
information about natural resources and commissioned 
the geographer Agustín Codazzi to draw a cadaster that 
identified Church or Indian corporate lands subject to 
privatization, and to delineate the vast, untitled frontier 
lands (Palacio 2006). Concerned with the institutional 
ordination of the new territory (c.f. Linares 2011) between 
1832 and 1863, they experimented with a number of 
political formulas to organize the country and increase 
the highlands grip over national political affairs (Rausch 
2013: 5). Such efforts were in stark contrast with the 
national government’s low institutional presence in much 
of the territory. According to Legrand (1989), a 19th 
century study estimated that baldíos (frontier or “vacant” 
lands) accounted for about 75% of the country’s territory, 
and were categorized as public properties. The 1863 
Constitution labeled these “enormous jungle extensions” 
populated by “savages” as national territories which 
should be c9olonized and “subjected to improvement” by 
passing their tutelage to the Catholic Church (Serje 2005). 
National leaders addressed the need to tame the frontier, 
or as Rafael Uribe, the early 20th century Liberal general, 
stated of “de-wild-ing” (desbravar) these lands as to make 
good use of their wealth (Serje 2005). 
But even if institutional designs to ordain the country’s 
territory remained in paper, they did have very real 
effects on lowland and Andean landscapes as a result 
of an increasing quinine, tobacco and coffee trade, the 
concession of baldíos to private companies, and the 
privatization of indigenous agricultural properties in 
communities near urban centers such as Bogotá, Vélez, 
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Pamplona, Popayán and Pasto, and the province of 
Boyacá (Palacio 2006). Rausch (2013) finds that the 
national government aimed to integrate the frontier 
through assimilation, evangelization, and acculturation 
with the help of catholic missionaries, who had the zeal 
and conviction to put up with the land’s ruggedness 
and tropical illnesses. 
As the international demand for tropical products 
increased so did interest in the economic potential of 
baldíos as a source of cheap labor and land expansion. 
Hacienda owners were spurred by a developing 
international market for tropical products, and replaced 
colonial-era institutions with liberal land, labor and trade 
institutions in order to export tobacco, coffee and quinine 
(König 1994). Facing a shortage of labor, hacienda owners 
coerced colonos and usurped their lands. They moved land 
limits and fraudulently contested peasant land titles with 
the help of local judges (LeGrand 1989). In 1874, Congress 
approved legislation on baldíos (Law 61 of 1874 and Law 48 
of 1882) to stimulate the productive use of land in public 
domains under the principle that the legal owner of the 
land is the person cultivating it (LeGrand 1989). 
These laws offered peasants an opportunity to stake land 
and resist hacienda encroachment. As long as baldíos 
offered the poorest classes free access to lands where they 
could be in charge of their own livelihoods, they preferred 
to escape hacienda economies (LeGrand 1989). Peasants 
opened new lands and for the most part, enjoyed their 
property rights for 10 or 20 years at most, after which 
time large land owners and land speculators dispossessed 
them. Consequently, capitalist expansion went hand 
in hand with the expropriation of peasant properties 
(Kalmanovitz 1989), even if some entrepreneurial colonos 
found a way of life in tearing down forests to “improve” 
baldíos and then sell for a profit (Legrand 1989). Legal and 
illegal transactions with baldios became a source of wealth 
for people at the local or even national level (Ortiz 1989).
With respect to Indian lands, one of the main changes 
came with Law 89 that passed in 1890. This Law provided 
indigenous people land stewardship to mitigate the effects 
resulting from their transition from “a savage state to 
one of civilization.” This law reflected the government’s 
expectation that indigenous territories and cultures 
would disappear, and contains articles that guarantee the 
stability of the reserves while Indians are in a “savage” 
state. The law recognizes the authority of the cabildos as 
representative institutions, delimits Indian lands, and 
establishes that reserves cannot be divided, embargoed 
or extinguished without court approval. If people in a 
particular place spoke an Indian language, kept Indian 
traditions or recognized themselves as Indians, but 
had lost their lands, a wrongful and illicit act had been 
committed. This law later enabled Indians to defend their 
autonomy and protect their territories.
Between 1914 and 1917, Manuel Quintín Lame a Nasa 
“terrajero”2 laid the foundations for the Indian struggles 
of later years.  Lame led a series of Indian uprisings 
called the “quintinadas” aimed at forcing landowners in 
the departments of Cauca and Tolima to leave occupied 
Indian lands and release terrajeros. Lame also resorted to 
legal campaigns in Bogotá to recover the original titles of 
the Indian reserves and to secure the central government 
protection of Indian lands by enforcing Law 89 from 
1890. This law reflected the government’s expectation that 
indigenous territories and cultures would disappear, and 
contains articles that guarantee the stability of the reserves 
while Indians are in a “savage” state. The law recognizes 
the authority of the cabildos as representative institutions, 
delimits Indian lands, and establishes that reserves cannot 
be divided, embargoed or extinguished without court 
approval. If people in a particular place spoke an Indian 
language, kept Indian traditions or recognized themselves 
as Indians, but had lost their lands, a wrongful and illicit 
act had been committed. This law later enabled Indians to 
defend their autonomy and protect their territories. 
The Junín and Pichincha Battalions from the cities of 
Popayán and Cali contained the quintinadas and captured 
Lame and several of his closest followers. By 1930, 
unfavorable legislation and government repression against 
Indians and their lands increased the cost of resistance. 
By the forties and fifties, selective assassination of Indian 
leaders and violent expropriation of Indian reserves by 
landowners extinguished the movement. 
Time 3: Self-defense, territorialized resistance
and national security (1930-1980)
The 1929 collapse of capitalist markets reduced the 
international demand for Colombia’s agricultural products 
and triggered a new model of economic development. 
Between 1934 and 1945, the Liberal party increased state 
regulation of the economy and expanded social rights. 
Institutional development focused mainly in the cities 
(Tovar 1989), sustaining the historical tendency of placing 
urban space at the center of political life (Pécaut 1989). 
Alfonso López Pumarejo’s (1934-1938) “Revolution on 
the March,” advanced the economic and social role of the 
state with fiscal, monetary, and social spending capacities 
___________________________________________________________
2 Terrajeros were Indians allowed to live in the hacienda lands—often 
lands taken away from the Indians themselves—in return for working 
for the hacienda owner.
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to organize a productive labor market and protect foreign 
and national capital investments in railroads, telegraphs, 
ports and agriculture (Colmenares 1989). His Agrarian 
Reform Law 200 of 1936 legitimated peasant land claims 
by loosening the power over public affairs held by the 
traditional parties, but especially by the Conservatives. 
However, local strongmen in control of rural populations 
checked the rights of peasants and limited the effects of 
reform (Tovar 1989). Government failure to guarantee 
rural labor contracts, social rights, and rights over property 
left it up to hacienda owners to adjudicate conflict, which 
allowed conflict to easily turn violent (Tovar 1989). 
Land frontier policies largely focused on the eastern 
llanos or tropical flood plains and grasslands. President 
López was fairly committed to developing this region 
because of its potential for growth, and for trade with 
Venezuela. However, this frontier “continued to serve 
as a place of refuge for people fleeing the highlands, as 
it had since the colonial era. The national government 
had fortified its presence in the capitals of the 
territories, but the plains and selvas surrounding the 
towns remained as lawless as ever” (Rausch 2013: 28). 
Modernization efforts did not transform ingrained 
views on the relationship between land, climate, and 
people. Unincorporated regions were seen as a growing 
threat to the nation’s cultural and political values.
The Conservative administrations between 1946 and 
1953 reversed the 1936 agrarian reform law. This era 
coincided with the start of la Violencia (ca. 1948-1954) 
a period of partisan violence and counter-agrarian 
reform, accelerated by the assassination of Jorge Eliécer 
Gaitán, a national leader with close ties to the Liberal 
party, and a vast following among peasants and the 
urban poor. During la Violencia landowners recovered 
the lands distributed in the late thirties, and enlarged 
their holdings by violently evicting small landholders. 
Although violence was first used to eliminate political 
opponents, it was soon utilized by rural entrepreneurs 
and big landowners to evict peasants who had arable 
settlements, in order to expand capitalist agriculture 
(Sánchez 1991). In response, peasants, sectors of a 
growing urban population, and to some extent, workers 
and local strongmen began to form their own alternative 
organizations to the traditional political parties (Sánchez 
1991). Such form of organization included the zones of 
peasant resistance formed in the 1940s in response to 
conservative government attacks on peasant properties. 
Peasant self-defense groups in the llanos and southeastern 
Tolima protected lives and properties from attacks by 
local party bosses and hacendados. The llanos for example, 
offered conditions of refuge, spurring the arrival of 
“politically committed guerrilla fighters” (Rausch 2013: 
28), from where they eventually launched an insurgency 
against the national government. These agrarian 
movements originated in the 1920s struggles to defend 
peasant lands and properties, and were later committed 
to the principles of Tolima’s guerrillas for the “defense of 
the property of others; the respect for family honor; the 
respect for the political and religious ideas of all peasants; 
the union and brotherhood with peasant workers without 
partisan or religious discrimination; and the organization 
of peasants to fight against thieves and reactionary 
persecutors” (González 1992). The peasant organizations 
also offered social programs, such as child care, education, 
or health that the state failed to deliver (Medina 1989). 
Mestizo and Indian peasants were less likely to be 
organized and their political relationships were mediated 
by large landowners or wealthier peasants based on 
relations of personal loyalty (Gutiérrez 2012). Self-
organization ended this pattern and produced new forms 
of intermediation. In the Ariari region of the llanos 
for example, the Liberal guerrilla leader Dumar Aljure 
presided over 60,000 hectares and built prosperous cattle 
operations (Rausch 2013). He collected taxes and offered 
protection in exchange, though some peasants criticized 
his coercive practices, he maintained local order and was 
tolerated by the national Liberal party leadership, for 
whom he continued to procure votes. 
The guerrilleros del llano were loosely connected to the 
Liberal party, and from their territorial base, leaders 
such as José Alvear Restrepo, Guadalupe Salcedo, Dumar 
Aljure and Eduardo Franco formulated a defense from the 
Conservative government’s army, created a revolutionary 
movement and drafted in a 1953 National Revolutionary 
Congress the “Leyes del Llano.” These contained 224 
articles that demanded that the population support the 
rebels and they would in turn “guarantee respect for 
liberty of conscience, expression, speech, religion and 
small properties (Rausch 2013). The Leyes del Llano 
called for the expropriation of large properties owned by 
those who did not contribute to the revolution, claimed 
the possession of land and cattle without known owners, 
and emphasized the duty of armed personnel to respect 
the civilian population as well as the Indian communities 
(Rausch 2013: 53). Some of these ideas were later contained 
in Agrarian Reform Law 161 of the National Front 
government of Alberto Lleras Camargo (Rausch 2013). 
Communist rebels did not abide by the Leyes del Llano 
and split from the revolutionary congress. 
In the early 1950s, the national government escalated the 
repression of peasants organized in the south of Tolima, 
forcing them to negotiate, surrender, or flee. As thousands 
10  Año 8, número especial, mayo, 2016 
Territory and Territoriality in Colombian Politics
Contextualizaciones                              
of people escaped violence, party elites feared that they 
had lost control of local politics and decided to support 
General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-1958) in a coup 
against the Gómez government. Rojas took on the 
pacification of the country and publicly claimed that 
peasants were “not bandoleros but victims of government 
neglect and party hatreds” motivating thousands of 
Liberal guerrillas to lay down their weapons (Rausch 
2013: 57). His calls for amnesty were heeded by less 
radical peasants, including the 6,500 Liberal guerrillas 
from the Llanos who demobilized under Rojas’ 1953 
armistice. To settle conflict and offer social programs, 
Rojas designed institutions to adjudicate justice 
(such as Military Courts of Appeal and Review and a 
National Secretariat for Social Assistance). Though they 
offered some relief, the policies did not overturn the 
old order allowing hacendados to usurp peasant lands, 
and neither did the government contain the attacks of 
“pájaros” or groups of conservative death squads. 
In view of government inaction to contain pájaros, 
Communist peasant leaders in the Upper Magdalena 
River Region of Tolima and in Sumapaz (south of 
Bogotá) distrusted the government and decided 
to maintain their territorial resistance (González 
1992). However, until the early 1960s, peasants under 
communist leadership were still open to negotiation 
with the national government. Leaders in Ariari 
(Meta) for example, were willing to “reincorporate 
themselves into democratic life and expressed their 
desire to collaborate with the government as to 
normalize the area in peace and justice, and peasants 
in Guayabero, facing increasing repression sent 
missives to the national government to clarify that 
they were not bandits, criminals or generally against 
peace and order (González 1992).” 
The army lost local legitimacy when it resumed the 
persecution of peasant guerrillas (Rausch 2013). The 
1954 attack of Villarica in southeast Tolima convinced 
peasants to form “marching columns” to seek refuge in 
regions of low government presence, but which produced 
enough food to shelter and help settle the migrating 
peasant diaspora, such as El Duda, Pato, Guayabero 
and Ariari in the departments of Tolima and Meta. In 
these regions they found earlier settlers who reluctantly 
agreed to subject themselves to the rule of the newcomers 
(González 1992). In 1955 up to 2,000 people arrived at 
el Alto Sumapaz and el Duda, forcing people already 
living there to either leave or subject themselves to the 
rules of the newcomers  (González 1992: 73). People who 
remained had to agree to form regional, zonal or local 
self-defense committees, or participate in indoctrination 
or political formation workshops (González 1992). 
Communists slowly replaced Tolima’s Liberal 
agrarian principles as the government failed to offer 
protection. In Colombia’s tradition of linking political 
ideology to space, national elites and local hacendados 
promptly stigmatized all the inhabitants of these 
regions as communists. Peasants on the other hand, 
self-identified as a self-defense f leeing government 
policy, and as political and ideological minority 
persecuted by the state (González 1992). Failure to 
adjudicate conf lict and protect peasant lands was 
just as problematic as lack of government support to 
developing a social and civil infrastructure that would 
enhance peasant productivity.
Rojas ultimately failed to end violence in the countryside 
and eventually lost the support of the traditional 
parties. Between 1957 and 1959, the Military Junta that 
replaced General Rojas Pinilla, designed “rehabilitation 
programs” as well as a “National Commission to 
Investigate the Causes of Violence in the Country” 
in order to reincorporate independent peasants into 
national politics. The rehabilitation programs sought to 
legitimate the state and pacify the country by controlling 
bandits and stemming communism (González 1992). 
The government also encouraged “bands of pacifiers” 
to do the dirty work of recovering independent peasant 
areas for the state (González 1992: 77). 
With respect to the indigenous movement, by the 
fifties, selective assassination of Indian leaders and 
violent expropriation of Indian reserves by landowners 
extinguished the movement. The partisan Violence of 
1946 to 1958 also deteriorated the political and economic 
lives of indigenous people. Some Indians joined peasant 
self-defense groups to protect Indian towns from violence. 
In 1949 for example, the village of Belalcazar was attacked 
and the Indian cabildo from the town of San Jose was 
massacred, and Indians effectively defended the towns 
of Santo Domingo in 1950, and Jambaló and Mina in 
1956 (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca., 1980). 
Cauca Indians also participated in the peasant enclaves 
founded by Liberal guerrillas. According to Gros (1991) 
Nasa Indians who participated in this organization 
learned about land reform and spontaneous resistance, 
undoubtedly an important precedent for the CRIC.
The National Front and the Failed
Incorporation of Peasants
Party elites formed a National Front government 
to reconcile their differences, replace the military 
government, and disband and de-politicize sectors of 
the lower classes that had associated independently. 
The bipartisan government represented a coalition 
of coffee growers, major industrialists and a landed 
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oligarchy that steered economic policy to favor their 
sector’s interests and excluded labor and peasants from 
economic policy-making (Palacios 2001, 14). 
By this time, rebel peasants adopted socialist worldviews, 
abandoning negotiations with the government (Gonzalez 
1992). The 1961 IX Congress of the Communist Party 
declared that in the face of government aggression 
peasant organizing would support a strategy based on the 
combination of struggles, or using both contentious and 
non-contentious strategies to advance peasant interests. 
The agrarian principles of the peasant organizations 
formed in the 1940s were thus upended, and peasants 
became more vulnerable to the government’s anti-
communist national security strategy (Gonzalez 1992). 
This period experiences the full development of the cold 
war agenda in the form of a national security approach to 
managing internal frontiers. As the national government 
stigmatized peasants organized in self-defense groups, 
hacendados opportunistically accused the national 
government of favoring communists whenever judicial 
authorities favored peasant property rights (Medina 1989). 
Alvaro Gómez, a far-right conservative senator, coined in 
1961 the term “independent republic” to stigmatize the 
peasant self-defense, denounce a Communist territorial 
encroachment, and highlight the Liberal government’s 
failure to control the Colombian territory (González 1992). 
The term not only achieved the further stigmatization of 
peasants, it effectively turned them into internal enemies, 
labeled their lands as zones of communism (Gilhodes 
1970), and justified government strategies based on 
psychological war, an economic and military blockade, 
displacement, persecution, capture, and disciplining 
(Gonzalez 1992: 107). 
In 1964, the Conservative President Guillermo Valencia 
(1962-1966) led four military operations against 
Marquetalia, Pato, Guayabero, and Riochiquito, and in 
1965 oversaw the “Operation against the Independent 
Republics” and the military occupation of these regions. 
Among the tactics used to end the “republics” the 
military and local landowners trained armed groups to 
attack the peasant self-defense and encouraged bandits. 
The 1965 military occupation lasted six months during 
which time peasants faced a veritable dirty war. At 
the end of the operation, the region was practically 
abandoned, as some 200 families went into hiding in 
the jungles of Caquetá (González 1992). At this point, 
the Communists organized as marching columns 
eventually forming the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC) whose political agenda included 
land reform and the establishment of a revolutionary 
state.  Between 1965 and 1969, hundreds of peasants 
were subjected to summary trials for the crime of 
“association to commit a crime” and about 200 political 
prisoners remained in local jails (González 1992). The 
effects of government repression on civilians radicalized 
peasants and led many of them to support the FARC. 
The Agrarian Reform Law of 1966 organized peasants in 
the National Peasant Association of Colombia (ANUC) 
and created the Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform 
(INCORA) charged with distributing land and legalizing 
titles.  Peasants rapidly mobilized and organized on their 
own without state support (Zamosc 1983). Law 1 of 1968 
designed to turn sharecroppers into landowners ended 
terraje. To avoid the INCORA, Cauca landlords evicted 
terrajeros had two choices: leave the farms established on 
their ancestral lands or organize to recover them with the 
help of  INCORA officials. Cauca Indian peasants supported 
ANUC and INCORA’s more progressive officials who 
encouraged mass mobilization and land takeovers (Cortés 
1984) and who were opening opportunities for Indians 
from different parts of the country to meet (Asociación 
de Usuarios Campesinos., 1974). Notwithstanding their 
support, Indians held misgivings about ANUC’s political 
platform defending private property and the creation of 
government-sponsored peasant user organizations3—
Cauca Indians defended collective land titles and the 
traditional Indian cabildos. According to Gros (1991) the 
Cauca Regional Indigenous Council (CRIC) emerged as 
a local variant of the national peasant movement led by 
ANUC, and maintained close relations with ANUC’s 
Indian Secretariat in the first three years after its founding. 
Influenced by these events and rallying the terrajero 
struggles, the CRIC defined a seven-point platform set out 
to recover Indian lands, increase the size of the reserves, 
strengthen the cabildos, end the institution of terraje, 
disseminate and demand the enforcement of indigenous 
laws, defend indigenous history, language and customs, 
and train indigenous educators to teach in their native 
tongue and according to the needs of indigenous peoples. 
(Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca 1980).
The agrarian reform led to political fallout between the 
Lleras government and big landowners (Silva 1989). 
To compensate them and lessen political conflict, 
the government paid high prices for the properties 
surrendered by landowners to peasants. When the 
Conservative Misael Pastrana (1970-1974) campaigned on 
limiting the agrarian reform, big landowners seized the 
opportunity to condemn the work of the Agrarian Reform 
Institute (INCORA) and stopped the distribution of land. 
President Pastrana struck a deal with large landowners 
in what was called the Chicoral Pact of 1972, and actively 
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reversed the agrarian reform process of the sixties.  The 
Pact reduced the impact of the INCORA and made it very 
difficult to expropriate land in favor of peasants.
In the four years after its creation, the peasants’ ANUC 
recruited one million people (Collier and Collier 2002, 
684).  After losing government support in the 1970s, the 
ANUC became a contentious organization that called on 
peasants to invade lands.  The result of the land invasions 
was a violent reprisal by government forces and large 
landholders.  Landlessness, lack of representation in the 
government, a failed agrarian reform, and repression 
all radicalized peasants.  Some peasant groups (as 
well as some leftists’ leaders and organizations) began 
to see guerrillas as legitimate representatives of their 
interests who could also offer protection (Corredor 
1990).  During the National Front governments, new 
guerrilla movements emerged.  The Army for National 
Liberation (ELN), the M-19 movement, and the Army 
for Popular Liberation (EPL) made similar claims to 
social justice as the FARC guerrillas, but enjoyed less 
support from peasants.  Counterinsurgency policies 
followed, and government repression radicalized some 
oppositional groups even more. 
The National Front governments failed to integrate 
peasants by offering them meaningful rights, thus leaving 
untouched the structural problems that led peasants to 
organize a territorial resistance. Careful scrutiny of events 
in the first part of the 20th century suggests that frontier 
lands were used as buffer zones by peasants protecting 
themselves from forceful expropriation and violence. 
They left intact the political and social structures that 
allowed rural strongmen to continue to hoard land and 
resources, and that ultimately failed to build a independent 
Colombian state (Bejarano and Segura 1996) by allowing 
the survival of Colombia’s “ancien régime.”  
Dismantling the National Front and the new
rural challenge
The political legacy of the “independent republics” 
and the National Front’s failure to incorporate 
peasants and address their claims inf luenced policy 
in the following decades. President Alfonso López 
Milchensen’s (1974-1978) for example, passed an 
Integrated Rural Development (DRI) program to 
achieve rural socioeconomic development that barely 
alleviated the material demands in rural areas. By the 
middle 1980s the drug trafficking business that began 
with the marijuana trade of the 1970s was enriching 
cartel leaders and middlemen, who invested large sums 
in urban and rural properties.  Julio César Turbay 
(1978-1982) approved tougher measures to criminalize 





and passed the Security Statute of 1978—a decree 
that toughened up measures to detain, interrogate, 
and judge civilians suspected of subversion or drug 
trafficking (Archila 2003).  
This environment of political instability was convoluted 
by escalating guerrilla conflict. The state’s precarious 
presence in its territorial frontiers areas was supplanted by 
FARC guerrillas, who discovered a population to dominate, 
an economic prospect (in the drug trade) to finance their 
cause, and a safe haven to strengthen themselves militarily. 
Colombian society stood in the middle of this centrifugal 
violence as armed actors appeared to be waging an all-out 
war against each other, the state, and innocent civilians. 
Paramilitary self-defense groups organized to offer 
security in areas where guerrillas were operating. These 
anti-subversive organizations were sponsored by large 
landowners (typically cattle ranchers), drug traffickers, 
and some members of the military forces. Paramilitaries 
formed deep roots in areas where the state and the 
justice system were absent and where there is large-scale 
commercial agriculture, and grew into an army of 8,000 
soldiers,4  organized as a semi-centralized national 
militia and composed of military blocs that operated 
in various regions. To paramilitary leaders, civilians 
in guerrilla strongholds provided subversive groups 
with shelter, food and active militants.  Therefore, 
guerrillas and paramilitaries engaged in a war over 
territory, resources and people and sought the control 
of geographically strategic corridors for the arms and 
drug trade, which constitute important sources for 
financing their armies.  Paramilitaries took certain 
territories of the country away from guerrilla control, 
often forcing the evacuation of entire communities. 
Time 4: Failure of the Territorial State and Neoliberal 
Governance (1990-present)
Continuing high levels of violence through the 1980s and 
1990s brought attention to the fact that the Colombian 
state had not established direct control over large areas. 
The United States government also identified Colombia’s 
lack of territorial control over its vast frontier as a major 
security issue. According to a RAND corporation study—
an influential foreign policy think-tank—these regions 
present a synergy between drug traffickers and guerrilla, 
challenging the national state (Rabasa and Chalk 2001). 
U.S. demands to control the traffic of drugs became 
more onerous than in previous decades, and the United 
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States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
increased its coordinating activities in an “effort literally 
to reconstruct the country of Colombia” (Walker 2001, 23). 
Plan Colombia, a military aid package approved during 
the administration of the Conservative Andrés Pastrana 
(1998-2002) was introduced in the U.S. Congress in 1999 
and approved in 2000 by the Colombian Congress.  The 
strategy cost $7.5 billion, out of which the U.S. Congress 
earmarked $1.3 billion in aid, while the Colombian 
government had to raise the remaining funds among its 
taxpayers or through international credit.  
In 2004, Alvaro Uribe (2000-2008) expanded Plan 
Colombia into a second military phase, known as Plan 
Patriota that expanded military operations to most 
regions of the country. The current state-building 
strategy is under the umbrella of the National Territorial 
Consolidation and Reconstruction Plan which targets 
“poorly governed rural zones” and is designed to 
establish a full civilian government presence in areas 
not governed by formal state institutions (Isacson 2012). 
Colombian civilians suffered the high humanitarian 
costs of a militarized state-building strategy, including 
political violence, mass displacement, and loss of lands. 
In addition, the plans have been fraught with military 
corruption including alliances between rogue military 
commanders with paramilitary groups in the fight 
against insurgents and the “false positives” scandals 
where soldiers killed 3000 civilians and passed them as 
guerrillas to show results in the war. 
Political fragmentation brought on a severe humanitarian 
crisis where “scorched-earth” tactics increased massacres 
and displaced more than 4 million people from their 
communities since the 1990s.  The lands abandoned 
by the internal refugees were taken over by leaders 
of paramilitary groups or by drug-traffickers, thus 
concentrating land even more than in previous decades. 
Between 2000 and 2008, about 385,000 rural families 
abandoned by force 5.5 million hectares or about 11% 
of Colombia’s agricultural land and lost an estimated 
12% of the country’s gross national product (Consejería 
para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento, 2009). 
According to the General Comptroller’s Office, by 2005 
armed groups had violently secured 70% of the country’s 
most productive agricultural lands (Portafolio, 10 June 
2005), coinciding with the forced displacement of 2.6 
million people between 1997 and 2008, or about 20% of 
the rural population (Agencia Presidencial, 2009). Energy 
and biofuel development near ethnic communities has 
led to displacement and food production shortages, and 
coca production has changed traditional economies 
while increasing militarization and fumigation of both 
legal and illegal crops. 
The negotiation of a new constitution
Violence and fragmentation was partly blamed on the 
country’s institutional framework that concentrated 
power in Bogotá and excluded other social actors from 
politics (Uprimny 2001). This was characterized as the 
partial collapse of the state (Oquist 1978) or its selective 
strengthening (Bejarano and Segura 1996). In practice, 
large parts of the country were dominated by de facto 
authorities, including paramilitary and guerrilla forces. 
Colombia was divided into a “paramilitary” north and 
a “guerrilla” southeast. As the government was trying 
to “cage-in (enjaular)” areas out of its reach, it brought 
attention to the coexistence of a democratic state with local 
authoritarian or clientelistic de-facto networks disputing 
the territorial domain of the national government 
(Gozález, Bolívar and Vásquez 2002: 249). This underlines 
the muddy borders of Colombia’s democratic state. The 
territorial dimension thus became even more crucial to 
understand Colombia’s conflict (Reyes 2009).
Sociopolitical upheaval and the recurring challenges of 
developing political and economic institutions that could 
integrate the nation, eventually justified the overhaul of 
the country’s institutional framework. A new constitution 
was negotiated with the participation of a diverse set of 
political and social groups, such as a small but influential 
student movement, the national Indian movement, 
and women’s organizations, among others.  The 1991 
constitution viewed decentralization and territorial 
ordination as complimentary processes to improve 
governability, legitimize the state, and prepare the regions 
for insertion into a globalized economy (IGAC 1997). 
It also established Colombia as a pluri-national state, 
recognizing the country’s multicultural identity. 
The government alleged that lack of governability was 
an offshoot of low state territorial control. For Santiago 
Montenegro, director of the National Planning 
Department in 2003, the causes of un-governability 
lay in the country’s geographical fragmentation, 
dispersed population, and a state that has failed to 
conquer its territorial frontiers (cited by Serje 2005: 33). 
The Agustín Codazzi Geographical Institute (IGAC) 
supported this positon with evidence that just about 
one third of Colombia’s territory was under the control 
of regional urban centers accountable to central state 
authority. Such urban centers were located in the Andes 
Mountains along the Magdalena and Cauca River axis, 
and the Caribbean basin. Large areas of the country in 
the llanos, Amazon, and the Pacific littoral lay outside 
the state’s purview. These were the lands historically 
populated by peasants evicted from their lands and 
native communities. Out of reach territories were also 
prime targets for the illegal drug boom. These frontiers 
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produce their own laws (la ley del monte) and their 
populations are both vulnerable to violence or to be 
stigmatized as ready supporters anti-systemic groups, 
especially in the so-called red or hot zones (c.f. Serje 
2005). 
Improved governability had as an ultimate goal 
legitimating the state through political, administrative 
and fiscal decentralization, and increasing civil society 
participation in the development and decision-making 
processes (IGAC 1997). A renovated link between state and 
society would center on the territorial dimension, in other 
words, on the specific processes of use and occupation 
of land (IGAC 1997). New conceptions of development 
and planning emphasized economic, social, cultural and 
environmental policies that were clearly articulated to 
a territorial vision (IGAC 1997: 27) that recognized the 
country’s different territorial dynamics. Government 
institutes such as the Territorial Ordering Commission, 
the National Planning Department, and the IGAC were 
set to steer this new vision of development.
The 1991 Constitution also reconfigured the country as a 
multicultural nation. The reforms established collective 
property rights of Indians to about 30% of the country’s 
territory, and of traditional Afro-Colombian communities 
to 4% of the national territory (DANE 2005). Collective 
rights however, are curtailed by article 332 of the 
constitution that establishes state ownership of subsoil and 
nonrenewable resources. Ethnic group autonomy rights 
were recognized under different legislation for blacks and 
Indians. Indigenous territories were recognized as public 
entities and economic development projects in their land 
subjected to processes of free, prior and informed consent. 
Indian cabildos became recipients of fiscal transfers 
and were covered by laws compelling decentralized 
governments to invest and devise development plans 
(see Law 60/1993 on decentralization and Organic Law 
152/1994 on development). 
Traditional Afro Colombian authorities were not 
recognized as public entities in the same manner. Like 
Indians, Black peasants in the Pacific coast and parts of the 
Andes, organized around the collective use of land. Law 
70 of 1993 created Black community councils to oversee 
collective property and natural resources and choose legal 
representatives to stand for the communities in relation 
to adjacent governments. The Law allows Community 
Councils some degree of autonomy but does not allocate 
fiscal transfers for them. Councils must therefore negotiate 
with municipal governments or seek outside financial 
support from national and international NGOs to do their 
work. After the reforms granted constitutional protections 
of ethno-political autonomy, most communities failed to 
benefit. This occurred because few regions could endure 
neoliberal economic reforms that de-localized decision 
making to favor large capitalist companies, nor could they 
fend off an increasingly regionalized political economy of 
war based on violent land occupations to control people 
and natural resources (Houghton 2008; Oslender 2007; 
García and Jaramillo 2008; Asher 2009). 
This legislative overhaul on ethnic rights boldly 
transformed governance in one third of the country’s 
territory, eventually colliding with national economic 
growth priorities that hinge on competitive, market-
based plans in resource- and land-intensive economic 
activities. A central point of contention is how article 332 
of the constitution that establishes state ownership of 
subsoil and nonrenewable resources curtails autonomy. 
This contradiction became evident in a set of legislative 
initiatives designed to open markets for environmental 
services and extractive activities. The Mining Code (Law 
685/2001) and the Forest Law (1021/2006), and bills 
to pass a Rural Reform and Water and Páramo5 Laws 
all contemplated some level of privatization, even in 
collective lands. Ethnic organizations, environmentalists 
and organizations such as Colombia’s Commission 
of Jurists, mobilized against the measures when 
they identified clear loopholes enabling investors to 
circumvent provisions on the rights of ethno-territorial 
groups (Jaramillo and Velasco 2007). The Constitutional 
Court agreed and in 2008 found the Forest Law 
unconstitutional on grounds that it violated ethnic rights 
to free, prior and informed consultation.
Such tensions were also at the center of acrimonious 
confrontations between the government and ethnic 
social movements. During a 2008 series of contentious 
episodes in the Cauca department where Indian 
cabildos were occupying privately-owned lands that 
they contended should be allocated to Indian resguardos 
or reserves, President Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2010) 
famously accused Indians of being the country’s 
largest landowners and keeping large tracts of idle 
land (González, 2011). Such rhetoric not only distorted 
facts about ethnic territoriality—most ethnic lands are 
located in protected areas such as forest reserves where 
the government wants to increase natural resource 
exploitation—it deliberately ignored that most of these 
lands are not under the control of indigenous authorities.
A year later, Colombia’s Constitutional Court condemned 
this state of affairs when it published Judicial Decrees 004 
___________________________________________________________




and 005 in 2009 (Corte Constitucional 2009a; 2009b) 
demanding government safeguards of ethnic minority 
rights. Decree 004 cites extensive evidence of gross human 
rights violations of indigenous peoples, including de-
territorialization and uprooting resulting from the illegal 
or irregular use of natural resources in ancestral lands, 
while Decree 005 orders the protection of Afro-Colombian 
communities violently displaced from collective lands. 
The Court found the government culpable for failing to 
protect communities or even colluding with illegal actors.
More recently, the United Nations Development 
Program criticized Colombia’s unsustainable political 
and economic use of its territory which exacerbated 
land-use conflicts. It characterized territorial politics 
as anti-democratic and unsustainable for increasing 
inequality and land concentration, and undermining 
rural institutions, including those of land-based 
minorities (UNDP 2011). According to the report, 
struggles for land appropriation and violence against 
rural civilians are leading causes of de-territorialization 
and internal displacement, forcing people out of their 
communities and into urban centers where they face 
poverty, discrimination, crime and acculturation. The 
report blames neoliberal rural reforms that increased 
inequality and land concentration, and undermined rural 
institutions, including those of ethnic communities. It 
cites the wasteful use of agricultural and pasture lands, 
where 78% of the 22 million hectares of arable lands are 
not cultivated, while cattle-ranching is overextending by 
54% (from 21 to 39 million). This is the result of violent 
counter-agrarian reform, large landowner preference for 
expanding cattle ranching or leaving land idle, and loss 
of competitiveness resulting from increased imports. 
Conclusions
This paper has described four critical junctures of 
Colombia’s territorial history with the hope of contributing 
to discussions on territorial politics. Territorial dynamics 
feature prominently in analyses of Colombia’s history 
therefore it presents an important case to the debate, 
since it links matters of internal colonialism, peripheral 
lands, and intractable cultural and ideological debates 
liking people to social space. Ideas of cultural superiority 
have justified the use of violence against racial “others” to 
seize land and natural resources (Roldán 2002). Cultural 
minorities have resisted this condition through land-based 
claims that link identities, political strategies, land-use 
practices and property relations to delimited geographical 
areas (Velasco 2011). Central to this process has been the 
enclosure of the lands of cultural, moral, ideological or 
social-class “others” to benefit private gain or the state’s 
own development. For Colombia’s state elites—who 
neither enjoyed legitimacy outside urban areas, nor had 
the technological, administrative of political capacities to 
absorb the frontier—peripheral areas were main sources of 
economic growth by appropriating  the surplus provided 
by labor, resources or land. 
This paper describes four times or different junctures that 
characterize the development of Colombian territoriality. 
During the first juncture conquering Spanish elites 
differentiated spaces of civility and barbarity, while 
indigenous peoples and other subaltern groups resisted 
Spanish encroachment by withdrawing to inaccessible 
social and natural spaces. The second juncture looks at 
the years after independence where mestizo elites largely 
defined themselves in opposition to cultural others 
confined to peripheral lands defined as wastelands 
waiting to be incorporated as productive lands. The 
third juncture expands on the period from 1930 to 
1980 when political party violence and failed attempts 
at modernization led up to a national security discourse 
connecting frontier lands to zones of communism and 
peasant insubordination. Finally, between 1990 and the 
present, efforts to recover the states territorial legitimacy 
and improve governance included the negotiation of 
a new constitution, the territorial reordering of the 
state’s internal limits, and the acceptance of cultural 
pluralism. However, this period has coincided with 
a growing environmental crisis. Not coincidentally 
Colombia’s humanitarian tragedy is largely explained 
by the expulsion of millions from their lands and the 
subsequent concentration of such lands in few hands. 
Adding this case to the literature on territoriality 
allows me make clearer connection to the social 
movement literature and the role of multiculturalism 
in defining territory. In sum, the Marxist analysis of 
social space helpfully highlight patterns of land use 
change that explain territorial conflict in historical 
perspective, while Liberal scholars provide insight into 
the construction of territorial rights as to understand 
how actors frame and produce institutional change. 
For a definition of territory I draw attention to the 
importance of the literature on social movements. 
Based on this reading of the Colombian case I offer that any 
definition of territory must spell out that territory refers to 
strategies and technologies that produce widespread and 
tangible transformations of natural and social space with 
clear implications on people’s culture, rights and economic 
practices. It must also clarify that territorial boundaries are 
never clear because cultures move and change their social 
space, and are more likely to contest the spatial claims of 
other cultures if their survival is at stake. Territory is then 
a type of space that reflects governance strategies to assert 
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or contest power by enclosing, administering, and shaping 
both human and natural environments with perceivable 
effects on ecosystemic, environmental, and socioeconomic 
cycles and with the potential of shaping the conditions 
for any culture to survive and thrive. Such strategies 
and technologies are informed by culture, particular 
forms of knowledge, and historical junctures that express 
hegemonic ideas and the preferences of powerful interest 
groups both inside that territory and outside of it. 
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